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This study investigates the extent to which sell-side analysts make full use of available financial 
and nonfinancial information signals in formulating stock recommendations. Prior research 
shows that investors rely strongly on sell-side analysts’ recommendations and that sell-side 
analysts pay considerable attention to nonfinancial measures in making their decisions.  
However, prior research has primarily focused on the mere presence of nonfinancial measures 
and not the extent to which the direction of such measures (i.e. favorability) is associated with 
firm value, or assessed the extent to which any interaction between financial measures and the 
 
 
direction of nonfinancial measures may influence analysts in formulating stock 
recommendations. Using a data set hand-collected from annual proxy statements, I use ordered 
logistic regression analysis to provide a multivariate test of the relation between sell-side analyst 
recommendations, financial and context-specific nonfinancial measures. I find that analysts do 
incorporate the direction (favorability) of nonfinancial measures in formulating stock 
recommendations and that unfavorable nonfinancial measures attenuate positive financial 
information.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates the extent to which sell-side analysts make full use of available 
financial and nonfinancial information signals in formulating stock recommendations. Sell-side 
analysts’ recommendations are the end-product from an extensive analysis of information; 
however, the introduction of new technology, globalization and the transition towards a 
knowledge based economy have decreased the value relevance of financial statement 
information and have forced interested parties to seek out information beyond the financial 
statements to judge firm value (Amir and Lev 1996; Ittner and Larcker 1998a; Lev and Zarowin 
1999; Liang and Yao 2005). Prior research shows that investors rely strongly on sell-side 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, recommendations and reported information (Hirst, Koonce and 
Simko 1995; Ackert, Church and Shehata 1996; Womack 1996) and that sell-side analysts pay 
considerable attention to nonfinancial measures in making their decisions (Dempsey, Gatti, 
Grinell and Cats-Baril 1997; Low and Siesfield 1998; Breton and Taffler 2001).  However, prior 
research has primarily focused on the mere presence of nonfinancial measures and not the extent 
to which the direction of such measures (i.e. favorability) are associated with firm value.  What 
are the implications when a company reports positive financial information but fails to meet 
established nonfinancial benchmarks or vice versa? This study assesses the extent to which sell-
side analysts consider the interaction between financial data and the direction nonfinancial 
measures in formulating stock recommendations.  
Prior research in psychology implies that negative information possesses greater diagnostic 
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value (Skowronski and Carlston 1989) and elicits more cognitive analysis (Taylor 1991) 
than positive information, which suggests that individuals place greater reliability and reliance 
on negative information. The corollary of these findings is that positive information is perceived 
to be less diagnostically-valuable and receives less cognitive analysis.  I examine whether this 
holds true for sell-side analysts when presented with both financial and nonfinancial information 
with contrariant content. The question is worth examining since firms are disclosing nonfinancial 
information more than ever before, and serves to highlight the source of the investment value 
provided by sell-side analyst’s stock recommendations. Are sell-side analysts adding value 
through the collection and processing of both financial and nonfinancial information useful in 
identifying undervalued or overvalued stocks, or are sell-side analysts’ recommendations more 
inclined towards stocks with specific financial characteristics that predict future returns? 
I expect this research to be of interest to both academics and practitioners.  From an 
academic perspective, the study contributes to the stream of nonfinancial performance literature 
by providing a better understanding of the predictive value of nonfinancial performance 
measures. It also contributes to a better understanding of how sell-side analysts evaluate stocks 
and their role in the price formation process.  From the perspective of investors, this research 
enhances the understanding of the usefulness (limitations) of both nonfinancial performance 
measures and sell-side analyst recommendations in investment decisions.  Finally, from the 
perspective of the sell-side analyst, this study provides another potential decision aid for making 
better recommendations (at least in terms of improved returns prediction). 
I begin my study by clearly defining the setting. Selecting the proper setting in which to 
evaluate nonfinancial measures is key to identifying the effects. Despite the increasing 
importance of nonfinancial information, prior research finds nonfinancial information is hard to 
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mandate and to standardize due to the firm- and industry-specific nature of nonfinancial 
information, the disclosure costs (e.g. competitive costs) and the risk of receiving vague and 
uninformative disclosure (Skinner 2008; Stark 2008).  To capitalize on the opportunities 
presented in examining nonfinancial information, I have selected the setting of executive 
compensation, specifically executive compensation contracts.  
Although, the objective of compensation-based contracts is to align managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders, inappropriately constructed compensation contracts may result in 
unintended outcomes when actions taken by managers result in wealth reduction for shareholders 
(Fields, Lys and Vincent 2001). To deal with this concern, companies have introduced 
nonﬁnancial performance measures (NFM) into executive compensation contracts. The intent is 
to increase shareholder value through the creation of a “balanced scorecard.”  The “balanced 
scorecard” offsets short-term focused financial incentives with long-term focused nonfinancial 
incentives which, in theory, create a better alignment between the interest of management (i.e. 
what’s best for me, now) and shareholders (i.e. what’s best for the firm, long run). Therefore, 
executive compensation contracts provide a unique environment (across many firms/industries) 
to observe management incentives motivated by both financial and nonfinancial benchmarks. In 
addition, detailed executive compensation information, for publicly traded companies, is 
available annually through the proxy statement filing.1  
Using panel data from a population of firms who have appeared in the S&P 500 Index at 
least once in the period 2000-2013, I first examine annual proxy statements and document each 
firm’s utilization of NFM in the compensation contract of the CEO based on a keyword search.  
                                                 
1 A proxy statement, containing executives’ compensation (including salaries, bonuses, equity awards and any deferred compensation) 
must be filed by a publicly traded company before shareholder meetings. State laws require that publicly held companies hold 
shareholder meetings on an annual basis and most publicly traded companies hold annual meetings soon after the close of their fiscal 
year to facilitate a discussion of financial performance over the previous twelve months.   
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Second, I identify the direction (i.e. favorability) of each nonfinancial performance measure in 
comparison to a predefined target from the annual proxy statement. Third, I collect consensus 
analysts’ recommendations and the corresponding financial data. Fourth, I use ordered logistic 
regression analysis to provide a multivariate test of the relation between the analyst 
recommendations, the financial and nonfinancial data to assess the extent to which sell-side 
analysts consider the context and predictive nature of each type of data (financial and 
nonfinancial), and their interactive effect, when making stock recommendations.  I find that 
analysts do incorporate the direction (favorability) of nonfinancial measures in formulating stock 
recommendations and that unfavorable nonfinancial measures attenuate positive financial 
information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I discuss previous 
literature and generate my hypotheses. Section III and IV outline my research design and present 
the findings, respectively.  Section V details additional analyses and Section VI robustness tests. 
Section VII provides my conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Analysts, Recommendations and Stock Characteristics 
Corporate monitoring, information production and dissemination are important functions of 
sell-side financial analysts’ activities. Prior studies have concluded that the information sell-side 
analysts produce promotes market efficiency by helping investors to more accurately value 
companies (Schipper 1991; Brown 2000). Sell-side analysts gather and process a variety of 
information about different stocks, form their beliefs about the intrinsic stock values relative to 
their current market prices, and finally rate the investment potential of each stock. As Elton, 
Gruber, and Grossman (1986, p. 699) observe, sell-side analyst stock recommendations represent 
“one of the few cases in evaluating information content where the forecaster is recommending a 
clear and unequivocal course of action rather than producing an estimate of a number, the 
interpretation of which is up to the user.” 
 It is commonly believed that a recommendation is the analyst’s way of communicating 
beliefs about future stock performance. For example, a “buy” (“sell”) recommendation may 
indicate the belief that the stock is under (over)-valued and is, thus, expected to generate positive 
(negative) future abnormal returns. Francis and Soffer (1997) state that hold recommendations, 
taken at face value imply that the stocks are fairly priced but they also explain that the skewed 
distribution of recommendations suggests that holds should not be taken at face value. To truly 
assess the value of analyst recommendations in investment decisions, the selection of stock 
characteristics that have demonstrated abilities to predict future returns is required (Drake, Rees 
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and Swanson 2011). Prior research highlights variables (comprised of quantitative financial data) 
that are predictors of future stock performance and that are commonly used by analysts in their 
valuations.2 Which is the basis for Hypothesis 1a, stated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1a.  Financial performance is positively associated with analyst 
recommendations. 
 
Performance Consequences of Nonfinancial Measures 
The informativeness principle (Holmstrom 1979; Banker and Datar 1989; Feltham and Xie 
1994) is the foundation of a large body of research that examines the implications of agency 
theory on the trade-off between risk and incentives.  Compensation contracts should include 
performance measures that provide incremental information about the dimensions of managerial 
action that the shareholders wish to encourage (Ittner and Larcker 1997).  The inclusion of 
nonfinancial measures in compensation contracts more closely align manager effort along the 
dimensions emphasized by those measures, resulting in improvements in performance (Banker, 
Potter, and Srinivisan 2000).  HassabElnaby, Said and Wier (2005) findings support the 
contention that firms that employ a combination of financial and nonfinancial performance 
measures have significantly higher mean levels of returns on assets and higher levels of market 
returns.   
Several additional studies suggest that nonfinancial measures are primarily important 
because they focus management on long-term actions, such as innovation and quality, which 
leads to better future performance (Kaplan and Norton 1992; Hemmer 1996; Banker et al. 2000).  
Consistent with these claims, several studies find that nonfinancial performance measures are 
leading indicators of financial performance, even after controlling for current accounting 
                                                 
2 See the Appendix for a detail listing of predictor variables of future stock performance (definitions and citations). 
7 
 
performance (Foster and Gupta 1997; Behin and Riley 1999; Banker et al. 2000). 
Relevance of Nonfinancial Disclosure 
One approach to determining the relevance of corporate nonfinancial information is to 
examine the impact of nonfinancial disclosure on the quality of sell-side financial analysts’ 
earnings estimates. Vanstraelen, Zarzeski and Robb (2003) find a positive association between 
sell-side financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and forward-looking disclosure. Barron, 
Kile and O'Keefe (1999) demonstrate that better quality information included in the Management 
Discussion and Analysis enhances the accuracy of the sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
These findings support Opdyke’s (2000) argument that a strong focus by sell-side financial 
analysts on financial data does not yield accurate earnings forecasts. Orens and Lybaert (2007) 
show that sell-side financial analysts using more forward-looking information, as well as 
information about innovation and research and development, make smaller errors in estimating 
future earnings. These results confirm the survey findings of Epstein and Palepu (1999) and 
Eccles, Herz, Keegan and Phillips (2001) showing that financial statements are insufficient for 
meeting sell-side financial analysts’ information needs. Which is the basis for Hypothesis 1b, 
stated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b.  T he  p re s e nce  o f  n onfinancial performance measures is positively 
associated with analyst recommendations. 
 
Direction of Performance Measures 
Psychology research on attribution and persuasion suggests that the perceived credibility of 
management’s communications depends on users’ ex ante expectations of management’s 
messages and whether management’s message confirms or disconfirms the expectation (Eagly 
and Chaiken 1975; Fiske and Pavelchak 1986). Thus, regarding performance measures’ 
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favorableness, since there is a tendency by management to provide a greater number of overly 
positive disclosures than overly negative disclosures (McNichols 1989), unfavorable or negative 
outcomes are regarded as more credible and have a greater impact than favorable or positive 
outcomes disclosure, ceteris paribus (Mercer 2005). 
The differential reaction to negative/positive outcomes is consistent with prospect theory 
which suggests that investors are more sensitive to losses than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) and in making judgments, the negative aspects of an event or a message are weighted 
more heavily than the positive aspects (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Peeters and Czapinski 
1990). Evidence from archival research supports this claim. For example, disclosures of 
unfavorable news result in larger analyst forecast revisions (Hassell, Jennings and Lasser 1988; 
Williams 1996) and stock price reactions (Cairney and Richardson 1998; Hutton, Miller and 
Skinner 2003) than disclosures of favorable news. Further, there are marked differences in the 
accuracy and bias of analysts’ earnings forecast for loss making (i.e., unfavorable) firms than for 
non-loss (i.e., favorable) firms (Das 1998). That is, even professionals react more to losses or 
negative information compared to gains or positive information (Anderson 1988).3 
Accounting research shows that when a measure is favorable, supporting or additional 
information increases the measure’s credibility. For example, favorable earnings forecasts are 
more likely to result in stock price movements when the forecasts are accompanied by 
supporting information such as sales forecasts and profit margins (Gigler 1994; Cairney and 
Richardson 1998; Hutton et al. 2003). In contrast, unfavorable news forecasts result in stock 
price movements regardless of whether they are accompanied by supporting information. Hutton 
                                                 
3  Other studies in psychology evaluated the different cognitive processes observed when individuals respond to unfavorable 
information. Skowronski and Carlston (1989) suggested that unfavorable information is perceived to be more diagnostic; thus, 
individuals adopt a more negative bias in light of such information. Unfavorable events prompt more cognitive analysis (Taylor 1991), 
narrowing the focus of attention on factors that cause the unfavorable state (Broadbent 1971). Marketing research finds consumers are 
more sensitive to decreases in perceived quality compared to increases in perceived quality (Anderson and Salisbury 2003). 
9 
 
et al. (2003) suggest that a likely reason for the interaction of favorable forecasts and supporting 
information, but not for unfavorable forecasts and supporting information is because unfavorable 
news is inherently more credible to investors or analysts than favorable news. Hence, 
unfavorable news does not require additional supporting information to increase its credibility. 
The same argument may be extended to the interaction of financial/nonfinancial measures 
and favorable/unfavorable outcomes. For example, when financial measures are unfavorable, 
their impact on sell-side analysts’ decisions should be significant and invariant with the 
favorableness of nonfinancial measures. However, if the financial measures are favorable, then 
nonfinancial measures are supporting information and should have a differential impact on 
analysts’ recommendations depending on the direction of the measures.  The above discussion is 
the basis for the Hypothesis 1c, stated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1c.  When nonfinancial performance is unfavorable, the association between 
financial performance and analyst recommendations is weaker than 
when nonfinancial performance is favorable. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample and Data 
To perform my analysis, I require data on analyst recommendations, open short positions, 
11 financial predictor variables, stock returns and nonfinancial performance. I obtain analyst 
recommendations from the Thompson Financial I/B/E/S Recommendations database. I/B/E/S 
provides analyst recommendations for a wide cross-section of firms.  I obtain open short 
positions from the Compustat Monthly Securities database, which will be used in the 
supplemental analysis. I obtain quarterly financial data from Compustat Quarterly Securities 
database and nonfinancial performance data from DEF-14A statements in the Edgar on-line 
database.  I obtain stock returns data from the CRSP database. 
My final sample, resulting from the intersection of Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and my 
hand-collected data, consists of 23,534 firm-quarter observations over the 52 calendar quarters 
from 2000 to 2013. For my main analysis, I rank firms into quintiles based on analyst 
recommendations (both levels and changes), and for my supplemental analysis, short interest in 
each calendar quarter t. For recommendation changes, I ensure that firms without a 
recommendation revision are included in the middle quintile. 
Table 1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analyses. The 
mean (median) value for Rec of 3.66 (3.68) indicates that the average analyst recommendation is 
only moderately less than a “buy” (which would be coded 4). A narrow interquartile range of 
0.15 (—0.09 to 0.06) for the consensus recommendation change, ChgRec, shows that analyst 
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recommendations are generally sticky. Nevertheless, the minimum and maximum values for 
ChgRec indicate that analysts occasionally downgrade a stock all the way from strong buy to 
hold, and vice versa. The mean short interest ratio, SIratio, is 3.6 percent, which is considerably 
larger than the median of 2.3 (due to some large values, as indicated by the maximum of 46.2 
percent). With respect to the 11 predictor variables, I find that earnings surprise (SUE) has a 
mean of 0.04, consistent with most firms reporting earnings that meet or beat the current analyst 
forecast. On average, total accruals (TACCR) are positive. Capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
average approximately 12 percent of assets. I find that firm size (MVE) is highly skewed, with a 
mean of $19,901 compared to a median of $8,311 (in millions). The average earnings-to-price 
ratio (EP) is only 3.0 percent due to some negative values (median 5.0 percent). The book-to-
market ratio (BTM) has a mean of 0.45 (median 0.36), consistent with prior research. 
Approximately 0.09 percent of a firm’s shares turn over on any given day (TURN). Realized 
sales growth (SG) averages 15 percent, and analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecasts (LTG) 
average 13.11 percent. Analysts’ forecast revisions (FREV) have a mean and median of zero. 
Price momentum (MOM) averages 1.0 percent for the preceding six months (median 1.0 
percent). 
 
[insert Table 1] 
 
Table 1, Panel B reports mean analyst recommendations and short interest for each year 
from 2000 to 2013. Beginning in 2000, I observe a peak in the average analyst recommendation 
followed by declines in years 2001 through 2003, and then a monotonic increase through the end 
of my test period. This shift corresponds with criticism of analysts that led to the Global 
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Research Analysts Settlement, NASD 2711, and NYSE Rule 472. One line of criticism focused 
on analysts’ conflicts of interest, including their incentive to maintain a positive relation with 
corporate managers to generate investment banking business and to obtain earnings guidance. 
Table 1, Panel B also reports another noteworthy change over my test period. The mean 
level of short interest is around 2 percent in 2000. The level then increases appreciably over the 
next eight years, reaching a high of 5.0 percent in 2008 before decreasing throughout the final 
year of the sample period. This shift, which corresponds with a dramatic increase in the number 
of hedge funds and the financial crisis, increases the importance of research that furthers an 
understanding of the role of short selling in the price formation process. Note that shifts over 
time have a minimal effect on my results because I rank firms into quintiles based on their 
relative values at a given point in time. 
Table 1, Panel C reports both the use and direction of nonfinancial measures by the number 
of observations and firms over my test period. From 2000 to 2012, I observe a monotonic 
increase in both the number of firms reporting the use and the direction of nonfinancial 
measures.  Specifically, I find a noticeable increase post 2006 corresponding with The Securities 
and Exchange Commission adopting amendments to the disclosure requirements for executive 
and director compensation, effective November 2006. 
Empirical Models 
First, I rank firms based on the consensus analyst recommendation. I/B/E/S codes 
recommendations into five ordered categories: strong buy = 1; buy = 2; hold = 3; sell = 4; and 
strong sell = 5. For analyses using recommendations, I reverse this coding (i.e., strong buy = 5; 
strong sell = 1) to allow for a more intuitive interpretation of my results. Each month, I use the 
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I/B/E/S consensus recommendation.4  I then use ordered logistic regression analysis to provide a 
multivariate test of the relation between analyst investment signals and a set of 11 financial 
predictor variables.  In all regression analyses, I assess statistical significance using test statistics 
based on standard errors that are adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by firm and 
calendar month (Petersen 2009; Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor 2010). 
Dependent Variables 
To capture a more complete picture of factors associated with analysts’ investment 
decisions, I study both analyst recommendations and recommendation revisions. I measure 
analyst recommendations (Rec) as the consensus analyst recommendation as of the last month in 
each calendar quarter, consistent with prior research.5 I include recommendation revisions, given 
that prior research finds that recommendation revisions might be better indicators of future stock 
price performance than recommendation levels (Womack 1996; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and 
Lee 2004; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman 2010). I calculate recommendation 
revisions (ChgRec) as the change in recommendation levels from calendar quarter t−1 to quarter 
t (i.e., consecutive quarters). An increase (decrease) in the consensus recommendation will 
indicate an upgrade (downgrade) in the stock relative to the previous calendar quarter t−1.6 
Independent Variables 
For my measure of financial performance, I select 11 financial variables demonstrated to be 
                                                 
4  Thompson Financial claims that recommendations not updated for 180 days are excluded from the I/B/E/S consensus recommendation 
(see Thompson Financial 2009,11). In addition, I/B/E/S calculates the consensus recommendation on the Thursday before the third 
Friday of every month (ranging from the 14th to the 20th day of the month). The requirement of utilizing the consensus 
recommendation serves two purposes. First, short interest data are made publicly available mid-month and therefore, both signals—
recommendations and short interest— are obtained at approximately the same time during the month. Second, it ensures that investors 
are given ample time to process and impound in price whatever new information is contained in both signals.  
5  Performing these analyses using quarterly data is intuitive given that the majority of the predictor variables (seven of the 11) change on 
a quarterly basis as financial information is disclosed.  
6  Ljungqvist, Malloy and Marston (2009) provide evidence that the I/B/E/S recommendations database contains systematic errors in the 
pre-2007 files that is likely to overstate the investment value of analysts’ recommendations. This study re-examines the investment 
value of analysts’ recommendations using the cleaned 2007 database. 
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predictive of returns in prior literature. I group the predictor variables into one of four 
classifications based on the nature of the variable (see the Appendix for details on the calculation 
of each variable). The first group, labeled Accounting, consists of earnings surprise (SUE), total 
accruals (TACCR), and capital expenditures (CAPEX). The Valuation group consists of the 
market-value-of-equity (MVE), earnings-to-price ratio (EP), book-to-market ratio (BTM), and the 
average daily stock turnover (TURN). The Growth group consists of realized sales growth (SG) 
and forecasted long-term growth (LTG). The fourth group, Momentum, consists of earnings 
forecast revision (FREV) and price momentum (MOM). These variables have been shown in 
prior research to be associated with future returns (see the Appendix for specific citations). Thus, 
I expect that sophisticated capital market participants, such as analysts and short sellers, would 
use information embedded in these variables when establishing their positions.  
In addition, I construct a variable to measure the favorability of a firm’s nonfinancial 
performance measures in CEO compensation. Following Ittner and Larcker (1997), I conduct a 
keyword search of annual proxy statements, found on the EDGAR on-line database, using terms 
such as “non-financial or nonfinancial,” “customer satisfaction,” “employee satisfaction or 
employee morale or employee motivation,” “quality,” “process improvement,” “re-engineering 
or reengineering,” “new product development,” “diversity,” “market share,” “productivity or 
efficiency,” “safety,” “innovation,” “operational measure or operational performance,” and 
“strategic objectives.”7  Next I read the compensation committee report to confirm that the 
keyword(s) are used in the appropriate context. Following Said, HassabElnaby and Wier (2003), 
                                                 
7  The SEC requires firms to disclose the principles underlying their executive compensation plans and performance criteria used in 
determining compensation. Therefore, I used the keywords mentioned above to search for firms that used the nonfinancial 
measure(s) in determining compensation. I classify firms that use only financial measures in their bonus plans, as well as firms that 
use none of the keywords in their proxy statements, as not using nonfinancial measures (NFM = 0; see the Appendix for 
examples). The remaining firms’ proxies include one or more of the keywords, and I therefore classify them as using nonfinancial 
measures (NFM = 1). 
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I create a dummy variable (NFM) to capture the firm’s reliance on nonfinancial measures in its 
bonus plans. NFM takes on the value of 1 if the firm uses nonfinancial measures, and 0 
otherwise.8    
In addition to identifying firm reliance on NFM, I also categorize the specific type of NFM 
used through its identification in the keyword search.  I identify 15 categories and create dummy 
variables (measure1 to measure15) to capture the use of the following NFM in the executive 
compensation package: customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, quality, reengineering, new 
product development, diversity, market share, productivity, efficiency, safety, innovation, 
operational measures, operational performance, strategic initiatives and other, respectively (e.g. 
measure3 takes on the value of 1 if the firm uses quality as a NFM measure, and 0 otherwise).   
Next I search the compensation committee report for evidence of the direction of the 
nonfinancial performance measure.  I create a dummy variable (UNFAV) to capture the 
aggregate direction of the firm’s nonfinancial performance. UNFAV takes on the value of 1 if the 
firm both utilizes nonfinancial performance measures and the executive fails to meet the 
performance goal, and 0 if the goal is met.9  Prior literature has shown a positive association 
between firms that utilize a combination of financial and nonfinancial performance metrics in 
CEO compensation and future returns (Said et al. 2003).  
Predictive Information Use by Analyst  
H1a and H1b predict the main effects that financial performance and the presence of 
nonfinancial performance are positively associated with analyst recommendations, respectively. I 
use Model (1) and Model (2) to examine these hypotheses.  Year and industry effects are 
                                                 
8  These firms are further identified into two subgroups. The first subgroup consists of firms using nonfinancial performance measures 
with specific weights. The second subgroup consists of firms using nonfinancial performance measures without specific weights. 
9  See the Appendix for an example 
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controlled in the model, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level and calendar month. 
𝑅𝑒𝑐(𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑐) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑇𝑀
+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝐺 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + 𝑒𝑡                      (1) 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐(𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑐) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀
+ 𝛽8𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑇𝐺 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + 𝑒𝑡                     (2)      
Where 
Rec = consensus analyst recommendation in the last month of the calendar quarter, where 5 = 
strong buy, 4 = buy, 3 = hold, 2 = sell, and 1 = strong sell; 
ChgRec = change in the consensus analyst recommendation from the previous   quarter;  
NFM = 1 if a firm utilizes nonfinancial performance measures, and 0 otherwise; 
SUE = seasonally adjusted earnings change scaled by price for fiscal quarter   q; 
TACCR = total accruals scaled by average assets measured at the end of fiscal quarter q; 
CAPEX = rolling sum of the preceding four quarters of capital expenditures ending at fiscal 
quarter q divided by total assets; 
MVE = market value of equity at the end of fiscal quarter   q; 
EP = ratio of the rolling sum of earnings over the preceding four quarters to price at the end of 
fiscal quarter q;  
BTM = ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity as of the end of fiscal quarter q; 
TURN = average daily volume per share over the preceding six   months; 
SG = rolling sum of sales growth over the preceding four fiscal   quarters; 
17 
 
LTG = consensus long-term earnings growth forecast at the end of calendar quarter    t; 
FREV = rolling sum of the preceding six-month earnings forecast revisions scaled by price; and 
MOM = price momentum, measured as the six-month raw return ending one month prior to the 
end of the fiscal quarter q. 
 The dependent variables, Rec and ChgRec, are predicted to be positively associated with 
the proxy for financial performance.  All variable definitions are shown in Appendix. 
 As indicated in prior literature (Drake et al. 2011; Jegadeesh et al. 2004), my financial 
variables of interest have been demonstrated to predict returns.10 I have summarized below, but 
the Appendix presents more detailed information on how each variable is computed.  I also 
winsorize each of the control variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles to control for outliers. Per prior 
literature, I group my financial variables into one of four classifications based on the nature of 
the variable.  
The first group, Accounting, will consists of total accruals (TACCR) and capital 
expenditures (CAPEX). TACCR provides a measure of the quality of earnings, and could signal 
earnings manipulation. For example, if firms excessively capitalize overheads into inventories, or 
if they fail to write off inventories in a timely manner, then the inventory component of accruals 
will rise. Such tactics lead to positive accruals. Sloan (1996) finds that firms with low accruals 
(more negative TACCR) earn higher future returns than firms with high accruals. He argues that 
the accrual-component of earnings is less persistent, and that the market does not take this effect 
into account in a timely fashion. 
However, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2001) point out that firms with large 
sales growth also experience large contemporaneous increases in accounts receivables and 
                                                 
10  See the Appendix for the corresponding citations 
18 
 
inventory, mainly to support the increased levels of sales. In fact, Chan et al. (2001) find that the 
decile of firms with the largest accruals experience sales growth of 22% per year over the prior 
three-year period compared to seven percent per year sales growth for the decile of low accrual 
firms. They also find large earnings growth for high accrual firms. Therefore, although high 
accruals may be symptoms of managerial manipulation in some instances, they are also 
associated with strong past operating performance. 
 Beneish, Lee, and Tarpley (2001) show that growth firms with high capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) also tend to earn lower subsequent returns. They argue that high CAPEX firms are 
growth firms that tend to overextend themselves. Again, if analysts pay attention to these results 
in formulating their stock picks, lower TACCR and lower CAPEX firms should receive more 
favorable recommendations. 
The second group, Valuation, will consist of the market-value-of-equity (MVE), earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), book-to-market ratio (BTM), and the average daily stock turnover (TURN). Banz 
(1981) and Reinganum (1981), among others, show that small firms have generally earned 
higher returns than large firms. While opinions differ on the robustness of the result and the 
interpretation of this variable, I will include a control for firm size. Specifically, I will compute 
MVE as the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of its most recent fiscal 
quarter. 
Both the earnings-to-price (EP) and book-to-market (BTM) ratio are widely used in valued-
based investment strategies. Starting with Basu (1977), several academic studies show that high 
EP firms subsequently outperform low EP firms. Similarly, Fama and French (1992), among 
others, show that high BTM firms subsequently earn higher returns than low BTM firms. 
Academic opinions differ on whether these higher returns represent contrarian profits or a fair 
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reward for risk. In either case, if analysts pay attention to the predictive ability of these multiples, 
I would expect high EP (and high BTM) firms to receive more favorable recommendations. 
TURN is a measure of the average daily volume turnover ratio. Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) show that high (low) volume stocks exhibit glamour (value) characteristics, and earn 
lower (higher) returns in subsequent months. They argue that TURN is a contrarian signal, and 
that high (low) turnover stocks are overvalued (undervalued) by investors. 
The third group, Growth, will consist of realized sales growth (SG) and forecasted long-term 
growth (LTG). LTG (the mean analyst forecast of expected long-term growth in earnings) and SG 
(the rate of growth in sales over the past year). Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show 
that firms with high past growth in sales earn lower subsequent returns. They argue that high 
growth firms are glamour stocks that are overvalued by the market. In the same spirit, La Porta 
(1996) shows that firms with high forecasted earnings growth (high LTG firms) also earn lower 
subsequent returns. If analysts rely on these results, low SG (and low LTG) firms should receive 
more favorable recommendations. 
The fourth group, Momentum, will consist of earnings forecast revision (FREV) and price 
momentum (MOM). These variables have been shown in prior research to be positively 
associated with future returns and I would expect high FREV and MOM firms to receive more 
favorable recommendations (see the Appendix for specific citations).  
 
Interaction Effect  
H1c predicts an interaction effect between financial performance and the direction 
(favorability) of the nonfinancial measure on both analyst recommendations and revisions.  
Specifically, when nonfinancial performance is unfavorable, the association between financial 
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performance and analyst recommendations is weaker than when nonfinancial performance is 
favorable. I use Model (3) to examine this hypothesis.  Again, year and industry effects are 
controlled in the model, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level and calendar month. 
𝑅𝑒𝑐(𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑐) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑉 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑉𝐸
+ 𝛽7𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑇𝐺 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑂𝑀
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝑒𝑡                                                                                                                       (3) 
where 
NFM = 1 if a firm BOTH utilizes nonfinancial performance measures and has a measure that 
meets or exceeds the predetermined performance goal (favorable direction), and 0 otherwise; 
UNFAV = 1 if a firm BOTH utilizes nonfinancial performance measures and has a measure that 
does not meet the predetermined performance goal (unfavorable direction), and 0 otherwise. 
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RESULTS 
 
In this section, I first examine whether analyst recommendations incorporate fundamental 
financial information and the presence of nonfinancial information in the manner shown by prior 
research to be predictive of future returns. Next, I examine whether analyst recommendations 
incorporate the direction (favorability) of nonfinancial information. Finally, I examine the 
significance of the interaction between financial information and the direction of nonfinancial 
information on analyst recommendations. 
 
Univariate Evidence 
Table 2 presents mean values for each of the 11 predictive variables by quintile for 
recommendation levels and recommendation changes. In Panel A, as I move down each column 
from the worst to the best recommendations, I find a monotonic (or near monotonic) increase for 
eight of the 11 variables. The increase for SUE, EP, FREV, and MOM is consistent with analyst 
recommendations properly incorporating the relation of these measures with future returns. In 
contrast, the increase for TACCR, CAPEX, SG, and LTG indicate that analysts misuse this 
information, which could cause more favorable recommendations to foreshadow lower 
investment returns. The overall pattern of information use indicates that analysts tend to issue 
more favorable recommendations for glamour stocks, even though prior studies show that these 
stocks earn lower subsequent returns (Lakonishok et al. 1994; La Porta 1996; Sloan 1996; 
Beneish et al. 2001). 
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[insert Table 2] 
 
Examining changes in recommendations, Panel B shows a clear pattern for only two 
variables; but in each case, the change is consistent with the relation of the information with 
future returns established in prior research. Specifically, as I move down the columns from 
downgrades to upgrades, I observe a monotonic increase for earnings forecast revisions (FREV) 
and stock price momentum (MOM). While prior research has generally found that 
recommendation revisions are better predictors of future returns than are recommendation levels, 
this analysis indicates that recommendation revisions fail to incorporate nine of the 11 items of 
predictive information. These results for recommendation levels and changes are like the results 
documented in prior research (Drake et al. 2011; Jegadeesh et al. 2004) 
 
Multivariate Evidence 
First, I use ordered logistical regression analysis to provide a multivariate test of the relation 
between analyst investment signals and the 11 financial variables (Model 1). In all regression 
analyses, I assess statistical significance using test statistics based on standard errors that are 
adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by firm and calendar month (Petersen 2009; Gow et 
al. 2010). Table 3, Panel A reports results using analyst recommendations and recommendation 
revision quintiles as the dependent variable, with quintiles coded from 1 to 5.11  
For recommendation levels, I find that analysts correctly incorporate the implications for 
future returns of only one of the Accounting variables: unexpected earnings (SUE). Analysts do 
                                                 
11 Note that quintiles are of approximate equal size (after adjusting for ties and including all recommendation revisions of zero in the 
middle quintile). Due to the low frequency of strong sell and sell recommendations issued by analysts, the most unfavorable 
recommendation quintile contains some “hold” recommendations. 
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not consider total accruals (TACCR) or capital expenditures (CAPEX), despite evidence that 
increases in those accounting measures are associated with lower future returns (Sloan 1996). 
Examining the Valuation measures, analysts correctly favor firms with a higher earnings-to-price 
ratio (EP). However, they also favor larger firms (LNMVE) firms with a low book-to-market 
ratio (BTM) and high growth (LTG), despite evidence that stock prices of such firms 
underperform the market. Examining the Momentum variables, analysts correctly favor firms 
with high earnings momentum (FREV) but do not consider stock price momentum (MOM) 
despite increases in this measure being associated with future returns. 
The results for revisions in analysts’ recommendations are reported on the right side of 
Table 3, Panel A. Examining the Accounting variables, I find that only (CAPEX) is statistically 
significant with the expected sign.  Neither SUE nor TACCR are statistically significant. For the 
Valuation and Growth variables, the evidence is mixed:  TURN is statistically significant in the 
expected direction, but BTM and LNMVE are statistically significant in the unexpected 
direction. EP is not statistically significant. The coefficient on SG is also significant in the 
unexpected direction. For the Momentum variables, I find that both MOM and FREV are 
statistically significant in the expected direction. 
 
[insert Table 3] 
 
Considering the types of information used by analysts in both their recommendations and 
recommendation revisions, analysts’ correctly favor stocks with positive earnings momentum 
(FREV). They incorrectly favor stocks with high forecasted growth (LTG) and low book-to-
market value (BTM). Thus, financial analysts view higher past and future growth as positive 
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features in recommending stocks, despite research that shows the opposite relation (Lakonishok 
et al. 1994; La Porta 1996; Sloan 1996). In addition, analysts also tend to issue more favorable 
recommendations for firms with low book-to-market ratios, even though prior research shows a 
positive association with subsequent returns (Fama and French 1992). This evidence indicates 
that sell-side analysts tend to favorably recommend “glamour stocks.” Prior research (Drake et 
al. 2011; Jegadeesh et al. 2004) reached the same conclusion based on analyses of earlier time 
periods. 
Presence of Nonfinancial Measures 
I next use ordered logistical regression analysis to provide a multivariate test of the relation 
between analyst investment signals and the presence of nonfinancial measures (Model 2). Table 
3, Panel B reports results using analyst recommendations and recommendation revision quintiles 
as the dependent variable, with quintiles coded from 1 to 5. Although the signs are in the 
predicted direction, I fail to find support for H1b that analysts incorporate the presence of NFM 
alone into the implications for future returns for either recommendation levels or revisions.  
NFM was not statistically significant. However, I find similar results for all 11 financial variables 
as detailed in the analysis in Panel A.  
Direction of Nonfinancial Measures 
I next use ordered logistical regression analysis to provide a multivariate test of the relation 
between analyst investment signals and the direction (favorability) of nonfinancial measures 
(Model 3). Table 3, Panel C reports results using analyst recommendations and recommendation 
revision quintiles as the dependent variable, with quintiles coded from 1 to 5. For 
recommendation levels, I find support for analysts incorporating the direction of NFM into their 
implications for future returns. The NFM coefficient is positive and significant, while the 
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UNFAV coefficient is negative and significant. Although the signs are in the predicted direction, 
I fail to find significance for either NFM or UNFAV for recommendation revisions. Again, I find 
similar results from all 11 financial variables for both levels and revisions.  
In Table 4, I report the average marginal effects for all coefficients in Model 3 for both 
dependent variables (levels and revisions). I choose to report these results as marginal effects as 
opposed to odds ratios for ease of interpretation.  Marginal effects are interpreted as the change 
in probability of being in a quintile for a one unit increase in the reported variable (e.g. SUE, 
CAPEX, etc.)  For the factor variables (i.e. NFM, UNFAV) marginal effects represent the discrete 
change from the base level (0,1). 
 
[insert Table 4] 
 
Interaction Effect 
Finally, I use the predicted probabilities from my ordered logistical regression analysis 
(Model 3) to provide a test of the relation between analyst investment signals and the interaction 
between nonfinancial direction (favorability) and the 11 financial variables. Table 5, reports the 
predicted probabilities of a firm’s inclusion in 1 of 5 quintiles (QRec and QChgRec) based on the 
following interactions between all 11 financial variables (FV) and unfavorable nonfinancial 
direction (UNFAV): 
Scenario (1): both Group 1 and 2; UNFAV=0 and FV in the 75th percentile   
Scenario (2): Group 1 UNFAV=1 and FV in the 75th percentile; Group 2 UNFAV=0 and 
FV in the 75th percentile 
Scenario (3): Group 1 UNFAV=0 and FV in the 75th percentile; Group 2 UNFAV=0 and 
FV in the 50th percentile 
Scenario (4): Group 1 UNFAV=1 and FV in the 75th percentile; Group 2 UNFAV=0 and 
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FV in the 50th percentile 
 
[insert Table 5] 
 
For Panel A, scenario (1) is the base case and assumes that both Group 1 and Group 2 are in 
the 75th percentile in all financial categories and neither group has unfavorable nonfinancial 
measure direction, which results in a 28 percent chance of having a consensus analyst 
recommendation that place both groups in the highest quintile (5).   
In scenario (2), I isolate the effect of unfavorable nonfinancial direction by holding financial 
performance constant (both groups at the 75th percentile) and varying the direction of 
nonfinancial performance (UNFAV=1, Group 1 and remains 0 for Group 2). Group 1 now has an 
approximate 22 percent chance of being included in the highest quintile, while Group 2 remains 
at 28 percent, unchanged from scenario (1).   In both scenarios, financial data was positive 
(above average) and held constant, while nonfinancial direction was changed from favorable to 
unfavorable for Group 1 between scenario 1 and 2.  As predicted in H1c, the negative 
(unfavorable) NFM direction attenuates the positive (above average) financial information for 
analyst recommendations that fall within this quintile as demonstrated by the approximate six 
percentage (statistically significant) difference in predicted probabilities between Group 1 and 2 
in scenario (2).      
Additionally, scenario (3) highlights the findings from H1a that financial information has a 
positive association with analyst recommendation. In this case, neither Group 1 nor 2 has 
unfavorable nonfinancial measures (UNFAV=0); however, I vary the financial information to be 
in the 75th and 50th percentile, respectively.  As expected, Group 1 (with above average financial 
data) has a 28 percent chance, opposed to a 21 percent chance for Group 2 (with average 
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financial data), of being in the highest quintile.  The difference is statistically significant. Again, 
this highlights the strength of financial data in the recommendation formation process. 
 In scenario (4), I examine the strength of nonfinancial direction’s ability to attenuate 
financial information.  In this case, I employ the same financial conditions for both Group1 and 
Group 2 as in scenario (3) (75th percentile and 50th percentile, respectively), but vary the 
nonfinancial measures so that Group 1 (with above average financial data) has an unfavorable 
nonfinancial measure, while Group 2 (with average financial data) has a favorable nonfinancial 
measure.  As predicted, Group 1 has the better financial performance (75th percentile) and better 
chance (22 percent) of being in the highest quintile compared to Group 2 (50th percentile and 21 
percent); however, the unfavorable nonfinancial direction for Group 1 attenuates its above 
average financial data. The difference between the probabilities of both Group 1 and 2 being 
included in the highest quintile is no longer statistically significant.  My results follow the same 
pattern for each scenario in quintiles 4 and 5.   
For quintiles 3 and below, having unfavorable measures, both financial and nonfinancial, 
increase, and as such, the data presents a different pattern.  In other words, less favorable 
outcomes increase the probability of being in the lower quintiles.  For scenario (2) of Table 5, 
Group 1 (UNFAV=1, 75th percentile financial) has a 24 percent probability of being in quintile 3, 
while Group 2 (UNFAV=0, 75th percentile financial) has 23 percent probability of being in the 
same quintile. This represents the exact opposite pattern experienced for the same scenario in 
quintiles 4 and 5.  However, the results are consistent with my predictions and prior theory. 
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
As a supplementary analysis, I also investigate the context within which short sellers make 
decisions and then compare those results with that of analysts. Short sellers are regarded as 
particularly sophisticated investors under financial economic theory.12   Like analysts, short 
sellers invest considerable time and resources in analyzing companies, but they face potentially 
different incentives. Unlike analysts who may be biased by the economic incentives faced by 
their sell-side brokerage firms, short sellers place their own capital at risk and have strong 
incentives to fully use all available predictive information (i.e. nonfinancial information). 
 I first examine whether short sellers incorporate fundamental financial information (Model 
4) and the presence of nonfinancial information (Model 5) in the manner shown by prior research 
to be predictive of future returns.  Next, I examine whether short sellers incorporate the direction 
(favorability) of nonfinancial information (Model 6). Finally, I examine the significance of the 
interaction between financial information and the direction of nonfinancial information on short 
sellers.
 
                                                 
12 Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that only informed traders with strong beliefs that stock prices will fall in the near-term will 
choose to sell stock short. Their reasoning is based on the notion that the high costs of short selling drives out uninformed traders, so 
that open short positions reflect trades by more informed investors. Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008, 491) comment that short sellers 
“occupy an exalted place in the pantheon of investors as rational, informed market participants who act to keep prices in line.” 
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𝑆𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝐺 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝑒𝑡                                                                                                          (4) 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀
+ 𝛽8𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑇𝐺 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝑒𝑡                                                                                                          (5) 
Where 
SIratio = number of shares sold short as reported for the last month of the calendar quarter 
divided by the number of shares outstanding as of the same date; 
NFM = 1 if a firm utilizes nonfinancial performance measures, and 0 otherwise; 
And other variables are defined as in Model (1). 
𝑆𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐹𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑉 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃
+ 𝛽8𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐺 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑇𝐺 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑂𝑀
+ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆
+ 𝑒𝑡                                                                                                        (6) 
Where 
SIratio = number of shares sold short as reported for the last month of the calendar quarter 
divided by the number of shares outstanding as of the same date; 
NFM = 1 if a firm BOTH utilizes nonfinancial performance measures and has a measure that 
meets or exceeds the predetermined performance goal (favorable direction), and 0 otherwise; 
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UNFAV = 1 if a firm BOTH utilizes nonfinancial performance measures and has a measure that 
does not meet the predetermined performance goal (unfavorable direction), and 0 otherwise; 
And other variables are defined as in Model (1). 
Multivariate Evidence 
Table 6, Panel A reports results from a model using short interest quintiles as the dependent 
variable (Model 4). I find that 6 of the 11 financial variables are statistically significant with 
coefficient signs in the expected direction.13  Additionally, I note that the explanatory power of 
this model (Panel A, pseudo R2 = 17.75 percent) is more than double that for the similar model 
using recommendation levels (Table 3, Panel A, pseudo R2 of 7.3 percent) and more than triple 
that for the model using recommendation revisions (Table 3, Panel A, pseudo R2 of .01 
percent).14  Thus, I find that short interest is explained better by the predictive information in 
fundamental financial metrics than is analyst recommendation levels or revisions. My evidence 
is consistent with other studies that examine the association between short interest and indicators 
of future returns (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 2001; Cao, Dhaliwal, Kolasinski and Reed 2007; 
Seybert and Wang 2009). 
 
[insert Table 6] 
 
As with analysts, I next use ordered logistical regression analysis to provide a multivariate 
                                                 
13 Note that the explanatory variables have the opposite predicted sign in the short interest model (compared to the recommendation 
models). 
 
14 Since the dependent variables differ across models, it is not possible to test for differences in explanatory power. However, given 
that I have standardized the dependent variables by ranking them into quintiles, their variation is similar. Specifically, the standard 
deviations of the quintile ranking of analyst levels, analyst changes, and short interest are 1.44, 1.41, and 1.41, respectively. Thus, 
I believe a comparison of pseudo R2s is informative. 
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test of the relation between short interest and the presence of nonfinancial measures (Model 5). 
Table 6, Panel B reports results using short interest quintiles as the dependent variable, with 
quintiles coded from 1 to 5. Although the sign is in the predicted direction, I fail to find support 
for short sellers incorporating the presence of NFM alone into the implications of their short 
positions.  NFM was not statistically significant. However, I find similar results for the financial 
variables as detailed in the analysis in Panel A.  
I next use ordered logistical regression analysis to provide a multivariate test of the relation 
between short interest and the direction (favorability) of nonfinancial measures (Model 6). Table 
6, Panel C reports results using short interest quintiles as the dependent variable, with quintiles 
coded from 1 to 5.  I find support for short sellers incorporating the direction of NFM into the 
implications of their short positions.  The NFM coefficient is negative and significant, while the 
UNFAV coefficient is positive and significant. I find similar results from all the financial 
variables as in previous models.  Like Panel A, I note the explanatory power of this model (Table 
6, Panel C, pseudo R2 = 17.81 percent) is more than double that for the similar model using 
recommendation levels (Table 3, Panel C, pseudo R2 of 7.4 percent) and more than triple that for 
the model using recommendation revisions (Table 3, Panel C, pseudo R2 of .01 percent).  Thus, I 
find that short interest is explained better by the predictive information in nonfinancial measure 
direction than is analyst recommendation levels or changes. 
In Table 7, I report the average marginal effects for all coefficients in Model 6 for short 
interest. I choose to report these results as marginal effects as opposed to odds ratios for ease of 
interpretation.  Marginal effects are interpreted as the change in probability of being in a quintile 
for a one unit increase in the reported variable (e.g. SUE, CAPEX, etc.)  For the factor variables 
(i.e. NFM, UNFAV) marginal effects represent the discrete change from the base level (0,1). 
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[insert Table 7] 
 
Finally, I use the predicted probabilities from my ordered logistical regression analysis 
(Model 6) to provide a test of the relation between short interest and the interaction between 
nonfinancial direction (favorability) and the 11 financial variables. Table 8, reports the predicted 
probabilities of a firm’s inclusion in 1 of 5 quintiles (QSIratio) based on the following 
interactions between all 11 financial variables (FV) and unfavorable nonfinancial direction 
(UNFAV): 
Scenario (1): both Group 1 and 2; UNFAV=0 and FV in the 75th percentile   
Scenario (2): Group 1 UNFAV=1 and FV in the 75th percentile; Group 2 UNFAV=0 and 
FV in the 75th percentile 
Scenario (3): Group 1 UNFAV=0 and FV in the 75th percentile; Group 2 UNFAV=0 and 
FV in the 50th percentile 
Scenario (4): Group 1 UNFAV=1 and FV in the 75th percentile; Group 2 UNFAV=0 and 
FV in the 50th percentile 
 
[insert Table 8] 
 
In scenario (1) both Group 1 and 2 have an 11 percent probability of having short interest 
that place them in the highest quintile (5).  In scenario (2), Group 1 has an approximate 
probability of 13 percent to be included in the highest quintile, while the probability of Group 2 
remains unchanged.   In both scenarios, financial data was positive and held constant, while 
nonfinancial direction was changed from favorable to unfavorable for Group 1 between scenario 
(1) and (2).  
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 As predicted, NFM direction attenuates financial information for short interest that fall 
within this quintile as demonstrated by the approximate two percentage difference, in predicted 
probabilities between Group 1 and 2 in scenario (2).  The unfavorable nonfinancial direction has 
increased the chance Group 1 will be included in the highest short interest quintile despite having 
“above average” financial performance.  However, unlike in the analyst analysis, the difference 
between the probabilities of Group 1 and 2 is not statistically significant. I find a consistent 
pattern throughout quintiles. 
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
 
In this section, I report the results of my robustness tests (all untabulated). I begin by 
examining the sensitivity of the results to using an interaction term between industry indicators 
and year indicators to allow for different time effects for each industry. I find the results 
qualitatively the same as those reported in my initial regressions. 
Next, I use an alternative short interest variable. In my additional analyses, I used the short 
interest ratio (open short interest divided by shares outstanding). As an alternative deflator, I 
scale open interest by the previous month’s trading volume and label this SIVOL. I find that 
SIVOL is highly correlated with the short interest ratio.  When I regress the quintile assignment 
of SIVOL on the financial and nonfinancial variables, I again find results qualitatively the same 
as those reported using the short interest ratio. 
 
35 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
I contribute new findings on how sell-side analysts incorporate publicly available 
information signals, both financial and nonfinancial, in their implications of future returns, and 
contrast how short sellers incorporate the same information. By so doing, I expand upon the 
results of Drake et al. (2011) and other studies that examine information used by analysts and 
short sellers.15  Consistent with prior research, I first find analysts and short sellers use publicly 
available information differently. Analysts over-recommend stocks with high growth and low 
book-to-market ratios, even though prior research shows these characteristics are negatively 
related to future returns. Second, I find that neither analysts nor short sellers incorporate the 
presence of NFM alone in their implications of future returns. Third, I find both analysts and 
short sellers incorporate the direction (favorability) of NFM in their implications of future 
returns. Last, I find unfavorable NFM attenuates positive financial information for analyst 
recommendations; however, I find no statistically significant support for short interest. 
My study contributes to the stream of academic literature on nonfinancial performance 
measures. A key assumption, underlying both the predictive and incremental value of 
nonfinancial measures, is the inclusion of nonfinancial measures will more closely align effort, 
emphasized by said measures, which in turn results in improvements in performance. However, 
prior research has focused solely on the inclusion of nonfinancial measures and not the alignment 
                                                 
15 Dechow et al. 2001; Cao et al. 2007; Seybert and Wang 2009. 
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between the nonfinancial measure and the effort, it seeks to emphasize. Effort which is expressed 
by the direction (i.e. favorability) of the measure. I show that analyst and short sellers properly 
incorporate the direction of NFM in both recommendations and short positions, respectively.  In 
addition, I show unfavorable nonfinancial measures attenuate positive financial information in 
analysts’ recommendations.   
My study is timely as there has been a significant increase in the disclosure of nonfinancial 
information over my analysis period. Specifically, reporting requirements in executive 
compensation have resulted in an increase in the use of compensation consultants by boards of 
directors in structuring executive compensation packages. An important implication of my study 
is that analysts and other interested parties are taking note of the direction (favorability) of 
nonfinancial data and incorporating this ancillary information in recommendation and investment 
decisions.  Therefore, it is incumbent on firms to clearly define nonfinancial measures and the 
effort they seek to emphasize, especially as they pertain to executive compensation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE (FINANCIAL) INVESTMENT SIGNALS 
 
The last month of each calendar quarter is labeled quarter t. On this date, I will measure 
the stock recommendation and short interest variables. Relative to this date, I will label as 
quarter q the most recent fiscal quarter for which an earnings announcement is made at least two 
months prior to the end of quarter t and no more than four quarters prior to the end of quarter t. 
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Variable Description Calculation Details 
 
  
SUE Unexpected earnings Seasonally adjusted earnings scaled by price for fiscal quarter q, as calculated by: 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞−4
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑞
   , 
where EPS = earnings per share before extraordinary items (DATA#19) divided by the split 
adjustment factor (DATA#17) [Compustat]; and Price = stock price (DATA#14) divided by the 
split adjustment factor (DATA#17)  [Compustat]. 
TACCR Total accruals Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (DATA#76) minus   cash flow 
from operations (DATA#108– DATA#78), scaled by average assets (DATA#44) as measured at 
the end of fiscal quarter q  [Compustat]. 
Since Compustat reports cumulative (i.e., year-to-date) data for cash flow items, adjustments 
were made to arrive at total accruals for fiscal quarter q (see Collins and Hribar 2000). 
CAPEX Capital expenditures Rolling sum of the preceding four quarters of capital expenditures ending at fiscal quarter 
q divided by average total assets as calculated   by: 
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑞−𝑖
3
𝑖=0
(𝑇𝐴𝑞+𝑇𝐴𝑞−4)/2
   ,  
Normative correlation 
with subsequent 
returns 
 
 
Positive 
(Bernard and Thomas 1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
(Sloan 1996) 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
(Beneish et al. 2001) 
where Capex = capital expenditures (DATA#90); and TA = total Assets   (DATA#44). 
MVE Market capitalization Natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal quarter q, as calculated by 
DATA#14  × DATA#61 [Compustat]. 
EP Earnings-to-price ratio  Ratio of the rolling sum of earnings over the preceding four quarters divided by price at 
the end of fiscal quarter q, as calculated   by: 
∑
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞−𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑞
3
𝑖=0
   , 
 
 
               Negative 
(Fama and French 1992) 
Positive 
(Fama and French 1992) 
where EPS = earnings per share before extraordinary items (DATA#19) divided by the 
split adjustment factor (DATA#17) [Compustat]; and Price = stock price (DATA#14) 
divided by the split adjustment factor (DATA#17)  [Compustat]. 
BTM Book-to-market ratio Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity at the end of fiscal 
quarter q, as calculated by DATA#59/(DATA#14 × DATA#61)   [Compustat]. 
 
 
 
Positive 
(Fama and French 1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Variable Description Calculation Details 
Normative 
correlation with 
subsequent 
returns 
 
    
 
TURN Stock turnover Average daily volume turnover ratio measured as the exchange-specific, percentile   rank 
of: 
 
∑
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙./𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
  , 
Negative 
(Lee and Swaminathan 
2000) 
where Daily Vol. = daily stock volume [CRSP]; Shrout = shares outstanding [CRSP]; 
and n = the number of trading days for the six-month period ending on the last trading 
day of calendar quarter  t. 
SG Sales growth Rolling sum of the preceding four quarters of sales ending at fiscal quarter q divided by 
the rolling sum of the preceding four quarters of sales ending on quarter q—1, as 
calculated by: 
 
∑ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞−𝑖
3
𝑖=0
∑ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑞−4−𝑖
3
𝑖=0
  , 
 
 
 
Negative 
(Lakonishok et al. 1994) 
 
 
LTG Long-term growth 
forecast 
where Sales = DATA#2  [Compustat]. 
Mean, consensus long-term earnings growth forecast at the end of calendar quarter t 
[I/B/E/S]. 
 
 
Negative 
(Lakonishok et al. 1994; La 
Porta 1996) 
FREV Forecast revision Rolling sum of the preceding six-month earnings forecast revisions to price ratios, as 
calculated by: 
 
∑
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑚−𝑖 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑚−𝑖−1
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑚−𝑖−1
5
𝑖=0
  , 
where FEPS = mean, consensus analyst forecast for one-year-ahead (FY1) 
earnings-per-share [I/B/E/S]; m = the last month of calendar quarter t; and 
Price = stock price just prior to the consensus measurement date    [I/B/E/S]. 
 
MOM Stock momentum Buy-and-hold raw stock return for six-month period ending one month prior to the 
end of quarter t [CRSP]. 
 
Positive 
(Bernard and Thomas 1989; 
Chan et al. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
Positive 
(Jegadeesh and Titman 
1993) 
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QUALITATIVE (NONFINANCIAL) INVESTMENT SIGNAL 
 
The following illustrates a single example of the data collection effort to operationalize the construct of “favorableness” 
in the nonfinancial performance measure. The example utilizes an excerpt from the 2013 DEF-14A (Proxy Statement) of DTE 
Energy Company (Specifically the Executive Compensation Section). 
 
 
 
 
 (continued on next page) 
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Data Collection (Example) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
 
 
 NF 
 
 
 
 
 
NFM_2013= 1 if the company uses a combination of financial and nonfinancial performance measures; 0 otherwise. 
Code_1 to _4= Represent the type of nonfinancial measure used (i.e. 1-Customer satisfaction; 2-Empoyee satisfaction; 6-Diversity; 12-Operational measure) 
Weight_= Represents the weight of nonfinancial performance in overall compensation (i.e. .5= 50%) 
 
 
 
 
 (continued on next page)  
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Data Collection (Favorability) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
 
 
 NF 
 
 
 
 
 
NFM_2013= 1 if the company uses a combination of financial and nonfinancial performance measures; 0 otherwise. 
Code_1 to _4= 1 if the nonfinancial performance measure was met; 0 otherwise. 
2013_FAV= A composite measure of Code_1 to _4 that is 1 if the nonfinancial performance is deemed favorable; 0 otherwise.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables  
Variable  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
 Min  Q1  Median  Q3                   Max  
Rec  3.66  0.43  2.00  3.43  3.68  3.87 
 
5.00 
 
ChgRec  —0.01  0.19  —2.00  —0.09  0.00  0.06 2.00  
SIratio 3.6% 4.1% 0.0% 1.5% 2.3% 3.8%       46.2%  
NFM 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  
UNFAV 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  
SUE 0.040 3.05 —37.72 —0.850 —0.070 0.960 211.92  
TACCR 0.010 0.090 —5.70 —0.010 0.010 0.030 0.440  
CAPEX 0.120 0.130 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.150 1.60  
MVE 19,901 34,595 71 3,901 8,311 18,466 282,006  
EP 0.030 0.290 —15.81 0.030 0.050 0.070 1.00  
BTM 0.450 0.420 —5.41 0.220 0.360 0.590 13.09  
TURN 0.090 0.080 0.000 0.040 0.060 0.100 2.63  
SG 1.15 19.23 —2.22 1.00 1.02 1.04 2957.78  
LTG 13.11 7.78 —90.20 9.07 12.00 15.44 161.80  
FREV 0.000 0.060 —3.80 0.000 0.000 0.010 1.22 
 
 
  
 
Panel B: Analyst Recommendations and Short Interest Values by Calendar Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
Year  n  Mean Rec  n  Mean SIratio 
2000  1,434  4.00  1,151  2.1% 
2001  1,545  3.89  1,228  2.6% 
2002  1,579  3.68  1,258  2.9% 
2003  1,647  3.47  1,554  3.0% 
2004  1,662  3.55  1,647  3.1% 
2005  1,684  3.57  1,665  3.1% 
2006  1,735  3.59  1,720  3.3% 
2007  1,745  3.60  1,720  3.3% 
2008  1,734  3.63  1,704  5.0% 
2009  1,730  3.60  1,697  4.3% 
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Panel B: Analyst Recommendations and Short Interest Values by Calendar Year 
 
 
Year  n  Mean Rec  n  Mean SIratio 
2010  1,770  3.70  1,741  3.8% 
2011  1,786  3.71  1,767  3.7% 
2012  1,817  3.66  1,797  4.0% 
2013  1,666  3.61  1,204  3.6% 
Full Sample  23,534  3.66  21,853  3.6% 
 
 
The samples consist of 23,534 (Rec) and 21,853 (SIratio) firm-quarter observations, respectively, during the period 2000–2013. See the Appendix for a more detailed description of 
how each variable is calculated. 
Variable Definitions: 
Rec = consensus analyst recommendation in the last month of the calendar quarter, where 5 = strong buy, 4 = buy, 3 = hold, 2 = sell, and 1 = strong sell; 
ChgRec = change in the consensus analyst recommendation from the previous   quarter; 
SIratio = number of shares sold short as reported for the last month of the calendar quarter divided by the number of shares outstanding as of the same date; 
     NFM = takes on the value of 1 if the firm uses nonfinancial measures, and 0 otherwise;  
UNFAV = takes on the value of 1 if NFM=1 and the firm executive has NOT met pre-determined nonfinancial performance measures, and 0 otherwise; 
SUE = seasonally adjusted earnings change scaled by price for fiscal quarter   q; 
TACCR = total accruals scaled by average assets measured at the end of fiscal quarter q; 
CAPEX = rolling sum of the preceding four quarters of capital expenditures ending at fiscal quarter q divided by total assets; 
MVE = market value of equity at the end of fiscal quarter   q; 
EP = ratio of the rolling sum of earnings over the preceding four quarters to price at the end of fiscal quarter q; BTM = ratio 
of book value of equity to market value of equity as of the end of fiscal quarter q; 
TURN = average daily volume per share over the preceding six   months; 
SG = rolling sum of sales growth over the preceding four fiscal   quarters; 
LTG = consensus long-term earnings growth forecast at the end of calendar quarter    t; 
FREV = rolling sum of the preceding six-month earnings forecast revisions scaled by price; and 
MOM = price momentum, measured as the six-month raw return ending one month prior to the end of the fiscal quarter q. 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
 
 
 
  
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Nonfinancial and Favorability Frequency by Calendar Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The samples consist of 23,534 (Rec) and 21,853 (SIratio) firm-quarter observations, respectively, during the period 2000–2013. See the Appendix for a more detailed description of 
how each variable is calculated. 
Variable Definitions: 
Rec = consensus analyst recommendation in the last month of the calendar quarter, where 5 = strong buy, 4 = buy, 3 = hold, 2 = sell, and 1 = strong sell; 
ChgRec = change in the consensus analyst recommendation from the previous   quarter; 
SIratio = number of shares sold short as reported for the last month of the calendar quarter divided by the number of shares outstanding as of the same date; 
     NFM = takes on the value of 1 if the firm uses nonfinancial measures, and 0 otherwise; 
UNFAV = takes on the value of 1 if NFM=1 and the firm executive has NOT met pre-determined nonfinancial performance measures, and 0 otherwise; 
SUE = seasonally adjusted earnings change scaled by price for fiscal quarter   q; 
TACCR = total accruals scaled by average assets measured at the end of fiscal quarter q; 
CAPEX = rolling sum of the preceding four quarters of capital expenditures ending at fiscal quarter q divided by total assets; 
MVE = market value of equity at the end of fiscal quarter   q; 
EP = ratio of the rolling sum of earnings over the preceding four quarters to price at the end of fiscal quarter q; BTM = ratio 
of book value of equity to market value of equity as of the end of fiscal quarter q; 
TURN = average daily volume per share over the preceding six   months; 
SG = rolling sum of sales growth over the preceding four fiscal   quarters; 
LTG = consensus long-term earnings growth forecast at the end of calendar quarter    t; 
FREV = rolling sum of the preceding six-month earnings forecast revisions scaled by price; and 
MOM = price momentum, measured as the six-month raw return ending one month prior to the end of the fiscal quarter q. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year  NFM observations  #Firms  UNFAV observations  #Firms 
2000  468  117  61  18 
2001  566  143  38  13 
2002  590  149  85  22 
2003  705  177  85  25 
2004  742  186  71  21 
2005  854  215  38  12 
2006  940  235  56  18 
2007  1,096  274  120  37 
2008  1,157  290  193  57 
2009  1,223  308  302  84 
2010  1,340  335  262  76 
2011  1,379  347  180  55 
2012  1,393  349  292  82 
2013  1,288  322  275  78 
Sample Totals  13,741  538  2,058  538 
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Panel A: Recommendation Levels 
TABLE 2 
Mean Values by Quintile for 11 Variables Associated with Future returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 QChgRec  n  ChgRec  SUE  TACCR  CAPEX  MVE  EP  BTM  TURN  SG  LTG  FREV  MOM 
Down 0.00  4,436  —0.28  —0.190     0.000  0.120  15,254  0.010 0.470 0.100  1.020 13.30  —0.010 0.000 
 0.25  4,183  —0.09  0.050      0.010  0.120  22,946  0.030  0.440  0.080  1.020  13.03  0.000  0.010 
 0.50  4,806  —0.01  0.080  0.010  0.110  20,912  0.030  0.440  0.070  1.020  12.69  0.000  0.020 
 0.75  4,612  0.06  0.190  0.010  0.120  24,420  0.040  0.420  0.090  1.660  13.12  0.000  0.010 
Up 1.00  4,697  0.24  0.030      0.010  0.110  17,045  0.030  0.440  0.090  1.020  13.03  0.000  0.030 
 
Panel C: Short Interest  Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The samples consist of 23,534 (recommendations) and 21,853 (short-interest) firm-quarter observations, respectively during the period 2000–2013. See Table 1 for descriptions of 
each variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. QRec is the quintile assignment based on recommendation levels. QChgRec is the 
quintile assignment based on recommendation revisions. QSIratio is the quintile assignment based on short interest. QRec, QChgRec, and QSIratio are scaled to range between 0 and 1 
(0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00) to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. 
 
 
 QRec  n  Rec  SUE  TACCR  CAPEX  MVE  EP  BTM  TURN  SG  LTG  FREV  MOM 
Worst 0.00  4,517  3.02 —0.100 0.000 0.090  8,946 —0.040 0.560 0.100  1.000 10.07  —0.010 0.000 
 0.25  4,644  3.43  —0.040      0.010  0.110  14,785  0.030  0.480  0.090  1.020  12.10  0.000  0.010 
 0.50  4,887  3.68  0.000      0.010  0.120  20.937  0.040  0.430  0.090  1.620  13.13  0.001  0.010 
 0.75  3,721  3.87  0.060  0.010  0.130  27,761  0.050  0.400  0.080  1.030  13.66  0.000  0.010 
Best 1.00  5,765  4.18  0.250  0.010  0.130  26,614  0.050  0.360  0.080  1.040  15.92  0.000  0.030 
 
Panel B: Recommendation Changes 
 
 QSIratio  n  SIratio  SUE  TACCR  CAPEX  MVE  EP  BTM  TURN  SG  LTG  FREV  MOM 
Low 0.00  4,370  0.6%  0.100 0.010  0.090  43,012 0.040 0.470 0.050  1.020 11.10 0.000 0.010 
 0.25  4,371  1.5%  0.100  0.010  0.110  25,404  0.050  0.440  0.060  1.020  11.79  0.000  0.020 
 0.50  4,370  2.3%  0.000  0.010  0.130  15,789  0.040  0.430  0.070  1.020  12.70  0.000  0.020 
 0.75  4,371  3.8%  0.060  0.010  0.130  10,072  0.030  0.450  0.090  1.020  13.51  0.000  0.020 
High 1.00  4,371  9.7%  —0.050  0.000  0.130  5,894  0.010  0.560  0.150  1.700  13.96  —0.010  0.010 
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TABLE 3 
Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel A: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Using Ordered Logistic Regression: Financial Information) 
 
Recommendation Levels Recommendation Changes 
 
Variable  Predict  Coefficient  z-stat  Coefficient  z-stat 
Accounting 
SUE 
  
Pos 
  
0.016** 
  
2.08 
  
0.008 
  
1.30 
TACCR  Neg  0.092  0.30   0.196  0.89 
CAPEX  Neg  0.617  1.66  —0.198**  —2.26 
Valuation 
LNMVE 
  
Neg 
  
0.340*** 
  
7.93 
  
   0.018** 
  
2.26 
EP  Pos  1.356***  4.21  —0.104  —1.83 
BTM  Pos  —0.434***  —2.86  —0.079**  —2.41 
TURN  Neg  —2.433***  —4.51  —0.432**  —2.21 
Growth 
SG 
  
Neg 
  
0.000 
  
0.60 
  
0.000*** 
  
9.93 
LTG  Neg  0.068***  8.04  0.002  1.05 
Momentum 
FREV 
  
Pos 
  
2.405*** 
  
3.45 
  
1.779*** 
  
4.15 
MOM  Pos  0.138  0.90  0.519***  4.75 
Pseudo R2    0.073    0.008   
 
 
 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. n = 
23,534 firm-quarters. 
This table reports log-likelihood results when analysts’ recommendation quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns. I do 
not report the intercepts for parsimony. See Table 1 for descriptions of each variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. The “Predict” column 
reports the predicted relation between the explanatory variable and future returns as indicated in prior research. I report test statistics based on standard errors that are adjusted for two-way 
clustering of residuals by firm and calendar month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 
Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel B: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Using Ordered Logistic Regression: Presence of Nonfinancial Information) 
 
Recommendation Levels Recommendation Changes 
 
Variable  Predict  Coefficient  z-stat  Coefficient  z-stat 
NFM 
 
 Pos  0.127 
 
 1.39 
 
 —0.003 
 
 —0.12 
 
Accounting           
SUE  Pos  0.016**  2.10   0.008  1.30 
     
0.016** 
  
2.08 
  
0.008 
  
1.30 TACCR  Neg  0.104  0 34   0.196  0 89
CAPEX  Neg  0.602  1.61  —0.197**  —2.26 
Valuation 
LNMVE 
  
Neg 
  
0.331*** 
  
7.59 
  
   0.018** 
  
2.26 
EP  Pos  1.347***  4.21  —0.104  —1.83 
BTM  Pos  —0.436***  —2.86  —0.079**  —2.41 
TURN  Neg  —2.456***  —4.50  —0.432**  —2.21 
Growth 
SG 
  
Neg 
  
0.000 
  
0.44 
  
0.000*** 
  
9.93 
LTG  Neg  0.069***  8.07  0.002  1.05 
Momentum 
FREV 
  
Pos 
  
2.409*** 
  
3.47 
  
1.779*** 
  
4.15 
MOM  Pos  0.134  0.87  0.519***  4.75 
Pseudo R2    0.073    0.008   
 
 
 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. n = 
23,534 firm-quarters. 
This table reports log-likelihood results when analysts’ recommendation quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns and a 
variable of interest (NFM). I do not report the intercepts for parsimony. See Table 1 for descriptions of each variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is 
calculated. The “Predict” column reports the predicted relation between the explanatory variable and future returns as indicated in prior research. I report test statistics based on standard 
errors that are adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by firm and calendar month. 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 
Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel C: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Using Ordered Logistic Regression: Direction of Nonfinancial Information) 
 
Recommendation Levels Recommendation Changes 
 
Variable  Predict  Coefficient  z-stat  Coefficient  z-stat 
NFM 
 
 Pos  0.193***  2.03 
 
 —0.013 
 
 —0.51 
 
UNFAV  Neg  —0.366***  —3.72  0.057  1.42 
Accounting           
SUE  Pos  0.016**  2.07   0.008  1.29 
     
0.016** 
  
2.08 
  
0.008 
  
1.30 TACCR  Neg  0.108  0 36   0.200  0 91
CAPEX  Neg  0.610  1.63  —0.198**  —2.25 
Valuation 
LNMVE 
  
Neg 
  
0.324*** 
  
7.44 
  
   0.019** 
  
2.40 
EP  Pos  1.326***  4.26  —0.106  —1.86 
BTM  Pos  —0.423***  —2.81  —0.080**  —2.46 
TURN  Neg  —2.398***  —4.44  —0.440**  —2.25 
Growth 
SG 
  
Neg 
  
0.000 
  
0.23 
  
0.000*** 
  
9.85 
LTG  Neg  0.069***  8.18  0.002  1.05 
Momentum 
FREV 
  
Pos 
  
2.381*** 
  
3.42 
  
1.783*** 
  
4.18 
MOM  Pos  0.132  0.87  0.519***  4.75 
Pseudo R2    0.074    0.008   
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. n = 
23,534 firm-quarters. 
This table reports log-likelihood results when analysts’ recommendation quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns and 
variables of interest (NFM and UNFAV). For this regression, NFM estimates the log-likelihood of a firm both reporting the use of nonfinancial measures and reporting a 
positive (favorable) direction of those nonfinancial measures.  I do not report the intercepts for parsimony. See Table 1 for descriptions of each variable, and the Appendix for 
detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. The “Predict” column reports the predicted relation between the explanatory variable and future returns as indicated in prior research. 
I report test statistics based on standard errors that are adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by firm and calendar month. 
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TABLE 4 
Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel A: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Model 3: Direction of Nonfinancial Measures)
 
Average Marginal Effects by Recommendation Levels (QRec) 
 
Variable Quintile=1 Quintile=2 Quintile=3 Quintile=4 Quintile=5 
      
NFM -0.0267 -0.0131 0.00119 0.00977 0.0289 
(se) (0.0134) (0.00641) (0.00102) (0.00493) (0.0141) 
      
UNFAV 0.0540 0.0226 -0.00537 -0.0196 -0.0516 
(se) (0.0154) (0.00570) (0.00259) (0.00559) (0.0132) 
      
SUE -0.00223 -0.00110 0.0000790 0.000806 0.00245 
(se) (0.00109) (0.000532) (0.0000708) (0.000394) (0.00118) 
      
TACCR -0.0148 -0.00731 0.000524 0.00535 0.0162 
(se) (0.0416) (0.0205) (0.00152) (0.0150) (0.0456) 
      
CAPEX -0.0839 -0.0415 0.00297 0.0303 0.0921 
(se) (0.0516) (0.0256) (0.00284) (0.0189) (0.0564) 
      
MVE -0.0446 -0.0220 0.00158 0.0161 0.0489 
(se) (0.00618) (0.00275) (0.00117) (0.00226) (0.00627) 
      
EP -0.182 -0.0901 0.00646 0.0659 0.200 
(se) (0.0429) (0.0216) (0.00473) (0.0156) (0.0475) 
      
BTM 0.0582 0.0288 -0.00206 -0.0210 -0.0639 
(se) (0.0206) (0.0105) (0.00153) (0.00754) (0.0230) 
      
TURN 0.330 0.163 -0.0117 -0.119 -0.362 
(se) (0.0731) (0.0379) (0.00813) (0.0261) (0.0838) 
      
SG -0.00000379 -0.00000187 0.000000134 0.00000137 0.00000416 
(se) (0.0000163) (0.00000805) (0.000000591) (0.00000589) (0.0000179) 
      
LTG -0.00944 -0.00467 0.000334 0.00341 0.0104 
(se) (0.00116) (0.000549) (0.000239) (0.000414) (0.00125) 
      
FREV -0.327 -0.162 0.0116 0.118 0.359 
(se) (0.0957) (0.0486) (0.00874) (0.0353) (0.106) 
      
MOM -0.0182 -0.00898 0.000643 0.00657 0.0199 
(se) (0.0210) (0.0104) (0.000881) (0.00759) (0.0230) 
      
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel B: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Model 3: Direction of Nonfinancial Measures) 
 
 
 
Average Marginal Effects by Recommendation Changes (QChgRec) 
 
Variable Quintile=1 Quintile=2 Quintile=3 Quintile=4 Quintile=5 
      
NFM 0.00199 0.00102 0.0000967 -0.00100 -0.00210 
(se) (0.00389) (0.00200) (0.000193) (0.00196) (0.00412) 
      
UNFAV -0.00861 -0.00452 -0.000542 0.00433 0.00934 
(se) (0.00600) (0.00321) (0.000473) (0.00301) (0.00668) 
      
SUE -0.00127 -0.000653 -0.0000610 0.000642 0.00135 
(se) (0.000985) (0.000505) (0.0000473) (0.000496) (0.00104) 
      
TACCR -0.0304 -0.0156 -0.00146 0.0153 0.0321 
(se) (0.0336) (0.0172) (0.00160) (0.0169) (0.0354) 
      
CAPEX 0.0301 0.0154 0.00144 -0.0152 -0.0318 
(se) (0.0134) (0.00686) (0.000677) (0.00675) (0.0141) 
      
MVE -0.00293 -0.00150 -0.000141 0.00148 0.00310 
(se) (0.00123) (0.000626) (0.0000603) (0.000619) (0.00129) 
      
EP 0.0161 0.00824 0.000770 -0.00809 -0.0170 
(se) (0.00864) (0.00444) (0.000424) (0.00436) (0.00912) 
      
BTM 0.0122 0.00626 0.000586 -0.00615 -0.0129 
(se) (0.00495) (0.00256) (0.000257) (0.00251) (0.00524) 
      
TURN 0.0670 0.0343 0.00321 -0.0337 -0.0708 
(se) (0.0299) (0.0153) (0.00144) (0.0150) (0.0315) 
      
SG -0.0000465 -0.0000238 -0.00000223 0.0000234 0.0000491 
(se) (0.00000472) (0.00000250) (0.000000376) (0.00000248) (0.00000495) 
      
LTG -0.000293 -0.000150 -0.0000140 0.000147 0.000309 
(se) (0.000278) (0.000143) (0.0000135) (0.000140) (0.000294) 
      
FREV -0.271 -0.139 -0.0130 0.137 0.287 
(se) (0.0649) (0.0334) (0.00361) (0.0331) (0.0683) 
      
MOM -0.0791 -0.0405 -0.00379 0.0398 0.0836 
(se) (0.0166) (0.00857) (0.000999) (0.00842) (0.0176) 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses (se) 
This table reports the marginal effect estimations when analysts’ recommendation quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) 
on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns and variables of interest (NFM and UNFAV).  See Table 1 for descriptions of each 
variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. QRec is the quintile assignment based on 
recommendation levels. QChgRec is the quintile assignment based on recommendation revisions. QRec and QChgRec are scaled to range 
between 0 and 1 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00), which correspond to Outcomes 1-5, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel A: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Interaction between NFM Direction and Financials) 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities by Recommendation Levels (QRec) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=5 Quintile=5 Quintile=5 Quintile=5 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.280*** 0.216*** 0.280*** 0.216*** 
(Group 1) (0.0142) (0.0184) (0.0142) (0.0184) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.280*** 0.280*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 
(Group 2) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
     
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Difference  0.0642 -0.0703 -0.00617 
se  (0.0163) (0.0131) (0.0203) 
z-stat  3.943 -5.370 -0.304 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=4 Quintile=4 Quintile=4 Quintile=4 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.189*** 0.170*** 0.189*** 0.170*** 
(Group 1) (0.00618) (0.00847) (0.00618) (0.00847) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 
(Group 2) (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00524) (0.00524) 
     
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Difference  0.0194 -0.0218 -0.00241 
se  (0.00599) (0.00425) (0.00785) 
z-stat  3.235 -5.129 -0.307 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=3 Quintile=3 Quintile=3 Quintile=3 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.229*** 0.236*** 0.229*** 0.236*** 
(Group 1) (0.00617) (0.00601) (0.00617) (0.00601) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 
(Group 2) (0.00617) (0.00617) (0.00599) (0.00599) 
     
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Difference  -0.00625 0.00619 -0.00006 
se  (0.00230) (0.00239) (0.000196) 
z-stat  -2.714 2.591 -0.292 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
This table reports the predicted probabilities by recommendation levels when analysts’ recommendation quintile assignments are 
regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns and variables of interest (NFM and UNFAV). 
Models 1-4 compare the probabilities: (1) UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile); (2) 
UNFAV=1, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile); (3) UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile) to 
UNFAV=0, Financials (50th percentile); (4) UNFAV=1, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (50th percentile). I also 
conduct a significance test of the difference between the predicted probabilities and report both the standard error and z-stat. 
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TABLE 5 
Use of Predictive Information by Analysts  
Panel B: Explaining Recommendation Levels and Changes (Interaction between NFM Direction and Financials) 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities by Recommendation Change (QChgRec) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=5 Quintile=5 Quintile=5 Quintile=5 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.211*** 0.220*** 0.211*** 0.220*** 
(Group 1) (0.00389) (0.00735) (0.00389) (0.00735) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 
(Group 2) (0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00329) (0.00329) 
     
Observations 18,271 18,271 18,271 18,271 
Difference  -0.00961 -0.00511 -0.0147 
se  (0.00687) (0.00303) (0.00758) 
z-stat  -1.399 -1.683 -1.942 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=4 Quintile=4 Quintile=4 Quintile=4 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.209*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.214*** 
(Group 1) (0.00403) (0.00487) (0.00403) (0.00487) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 
(Group 2) (0.00403) (0.00403) (0.00387) (0.00387) 
     
Observations 18,271 18,271 18,271 18,271 
Difference  -0.00422 -0.00238 -0.00661 
se  (0.00293) (0.00140) (0.00326) 
z-stat  -1.444 -1.696 -2.028 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=3 Quintile=3 Quintile=3 Quintile=3 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 
(Group 1) (0.00385) (0.00388) (0.00385) (0.00388) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 
(Group 2) (0.00385) (0.00385) (0.00386) (0.00386) 
     
Observations 18,271 18,271 18,271 18,271 
Difference  0.000818 0.000313 0.00113 
se  (0.000674) (0.000201) (0.000719) 
z-stat  1.214 1.557 1.573 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
This table reports the predicted probabilities by recommendation changes when analysts’ recommendation revision quintile 
assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns and variables of interest 
(NFM and UNFAV). Models 1-4 compare the probabilities: (1) UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (75th 
percentile); (2) UNFAV=1, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile); (3) UNFAV=0, Financials (75th 
percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (50th percentile); (4) UNFAV=1, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (50th 
percentile). I also conduct a significance test of the difference between the predicted probabilities and report both the standard error 
and z-stat. 
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TABLE 6 
Use of Predictive Information by Short Sellers 
 
Panel A: Explaining Short Interest (Using Ordered Logistic Regression: Financial Information)) 
 
 Short Interest  
Variable  Predict  Coefficient  z-stat 
Accounting 
SUE 
  
Neg 
  
0.004 
  
0.82 
TACCR  Pos  0.836  1.63 
CAPEX  Pos  —0.263  —0.82 
Valuation 
LNMV
E 
  
Pos 
  
—0.796*** 
  
—16.21 
P  Neg  0.167  0.70 
BTM  Neg  —0.668***  —4.45 
TURN  Pos  18.561***  13.27 
Growth 
SG Pos 0.002*** 3.00 
LTG 
Momentum 
Pos 0.014**  2.07 
FREV Neg 0.310 0.37 
MOM Neg —0.472*** —2.87 
Pseudo R2  0.1775  
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. n = 21,853 
firm-quarters. 
This table reports log-likelihood results when short interest quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns. I do not report the 
intercepts for parsimony. See Table 1 for descriptions of each variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. The “Predict” column reports the predicted 
relation between the explanatory variable and future returns as indicated in prior research. I report test statistics based on standard errors that are adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by 
firm and calendar month. 
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TABLE 6 
Use of Predictive Information by Short Sellers 
 
Panel B: Explaining Short Interest (Using Ordered Logistic Regression: Presence of Nonfinancial Information) 
 
 
 Short Interest  
Variable  Predict  Coefficient  z-stat 
NFM  Neg 
 
 —0.134 
 
 —1.53 
 
Accounting       
SUE  Neg  0.004  0.73 
TACCR  Pos  0.826  1.62 
CAPEX  Pos  —0.245  —0.76 
Valuation 
LNMV
E 
  
Pos 
  
—0.787*** 
  
—15.94 
P  Neg  0.165  0.70 
BTM  Neg  —0.667***  —4.45 
TURN  Pos  18.619***  13.14 
Growth 
SG Pos 0.002*** 3.08 
LTG 
Momentum 
Pos 0.013**  1.97 
FREV Neg 0.306 0.37 
MOM Neg —0.473*** —2.89 
Pseudo R2  0.1778  
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. n = 21,853 
firm-quarters. 
This table reports log-likelihood results when short interest quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns. I do not report the 
intercepts for parsimony. See Table 1 for descriptions of each variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. The “Predict” column reports the predicted 
relation between the explanatory variable and future returns as indicated in prior research. I report test statistics based on standard errors that are adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by 
firm and calendar month. 
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TABLE 6 
Use of Predictive Information by Short Sellers 
 
Panel C: Explaining Short Interest (Using Ordered Logistic Regression: Direction of Nonfinancial Information) 
 
 Short Interest  
Variable  Predict  Coefficient  z-stat 
NFM  Neg 
 
 —0.167* 
 
 —1.89 
 
UNFAV  Pos  0.205**  2.10 
       
Accounting       
SUE  Neg  0.004  0.74 
TACCR  Pos  0.855*  1.68 
CAPEX  Pos  —0.242  —0.75 
Valuation 
LNMV
E 
  
Pos 
  
—0.784*** 
  
—15.87 
P  Neg  0.163  0.70 
BTM  Neg  —0.675***  —4.50 
TURN  Pos  18.569***  13.12 
Growth 
SG Pos 0.002*** 3.06 
LTG 
Momentum 
Pos 0.013**  1.99 
FREV Neg 0.311 0.37 
MOM Neg —0.471*** —2.88 
Pseudo R2  0.1781  
 
 
 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. n = 21,853 
firm-quarters. 
This table reports log-likelihood results when short interest quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns. I do not report the 
intercepts for parsimony. See Table 1 for descriptions of each variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. The “Predict” column reports the predicted 
relation between the explanatory variable and future returns as indicated in prior research. I report test statistics based on standard errors that are adjusted for two-way clustering of residuals by 
firm and calendar month. 
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TABLE 7 
Use of Predictive Information by Short Sellers  
Panel A: Explaining Short Interest (Model 3: Direction of Nonfinancial Measures) 
 
Average Marginal Effects by Short Interest (QSIratio) 
 
Variable Quintile=1 Quintile=2 Quintile=3 Quintile=4 Quintile=5 
      
      
NFM 0.0189 0.00866 -0.0000290 -0.00913 -0.0184 
(se) (0.00994) (0.00471) (0.000404) (0.00485) (0.00981) 
      
NUNFAV -0.0225 -0.0109 -0.000659 0.0108 0.0233 
(se) (0.0104) (0.00538) (0.000811) (0.00492) (0.0115) 
      
SUE -0.000468 -0.000210 0.00000127 0.000223 0.000452 
(se) (0.000632) (0.000284) (0.0000100) (0.000303) (0.000610) 
      
TACCR -0.0974 -0.0436 0.000265 0.0465 0.0942 
(se) (0.0580) (0.0260) (0.00203) (0.0276) (0.0564) 
      
CAPEX 0.0276 0.0124 -0.0000750 -0.0132 -0.0267 
(se) (0.0367) (0.0165) (0.000573) (0.0176) (0.0356) 
      
MVE 0.0892 0.0400 -0.000243 -0.0427 -0.0863 
(se) (0.00497) (0.00303) (0.00187) (0.00236) (0.00613) 
      
EP -0.0185 -0.00829 0.0000503 0.00884 0.0179 
(se) (0.0266) (0.0119) (0.000390) (0.0127) (0.0258) 
      
BTM 0.0769 0.0344 -0.000209 -0.0367 -0.0743 
(se) (0.0171) (0.00772) (0.00161) (0.00831) (0.0164) 
      
TURN -2.114 -0.947 0.00574 1.010 2.045 
(se) (0.166) (0.0806) (0.0445) (0.0960) (0.127) 
      
SG -0.000205 -0.0000919 0.000000557 0.0000980 0.000198 
(se) (0.0000673) (0.0000304) (0.00000430) (0.0000326) (0.0000648) 
      
LTG -0.00150 -0.000673 0.00000408 0.000718 0.00145 
(se) (0.000755) (0.000340) (0.0000315) (0.000358) (0.000735) 
      
FREV -0.0354 -0.0159 0.0000963 0.0169 0.0343 
(se) (0.0945) (0.0423) (0.000792) (0.0452) (0.0914) 
      
MOM 0.0536 0.0240 -0.000146 -0.0256 -0.0519 
(se) (0.0188) (0.00837) (0.00113) (0.00896) (0.0181) 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses (se) 
This table reports the marginal effect estimations when analysts’ recommendation quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) 
on 11 variables shown to be predictive of future returns and variables of interest (NFM and UNFAV). See Table 1 for descriptions of each 
variable, and the Appendix for detailed explanations of how each variable is calculated. QSIratio is the quintile assignment based on 
short interest and is scaled to range between 0 and 1 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00).  
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TABLE 8 
Use of Predictive Information by Short Sellers  
Explaining Short Interest (Interaction between NFM Direction and Financials) 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities by Short Interest (QSIratio) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=5 Quintile=5 Quintile=5 Quintile=5 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.107*** 0.128*** 0.107*** 0.128*** 
(Group 1) (0.00832) (0.0137) (0.00832) (0.0137) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
(Group 2) (0.00832) (0.00832) (0.00726) (0.00726) 
     
Observations 17,403 17,403 17,403 17,403 
Difference  -0.0209 0.00412 -0.0168 
se  (0.0106) (0.00790) (0.0135) 
z-stat  -1.961 0.522 -1.239 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=4 Quintile=4 Quintile=4 Quintile=4 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.232*** 0.257*** 0.232*** 0.257*** 
(Group 1) (0.0110) (0.0145) (0.0110) (0.0145) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 
(Group 2) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.00836) (0.00836) 
     
Observations 17,403 17,403 17,403 17,403 
Difference  -0.0248 0.00527 -0.0196 
se  (0.0116) (0.0101) (0.0150) 
z-stat  -2.143 0.520 -1.302 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Quintile=3 Quintile=3 Quintile=3 Quintile=3 
     
UNFAV x Financials 0.282*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 
(Group 1) (0.00854) (0.00843) (0.00854) (0.00843) 
UNFAV x Financials 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 
(Group 2) (0.00854) (0.00854) (0.00840) (0.00840) 
     
Observations 17,403 17,403 17,403 17,403 
Difference  0.000263 0.000354 0.000617 
se  (0.00210) (0.000822) (0.00155) 
z-stat  0.125 0.431 0.398 
  
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the α = 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
This table reports the predicted probabilities when short interest quintile assignments are regressed (using ordered Logit) on 11 
variables shown to be predictive of future returns and variables of interest (NFM and UNFAV). Models 1-4 compare the probabilities: 
(1) UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile); (2) UNFAV=1, Financials (75th percentile) to 
UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile); (3) UNFAV=0, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (50th perct); (4) 
UNFAV=1, Financials (75th percentile) to UNFAV=0, Financials (50th percentile). I also conduct a significance test of the difference 
between the predicted probabilities and report both the standard error and z-stat. 
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